UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-4-2011

State v. Lippert Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38613

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Lippert Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38613" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2915.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2915

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

NO. 38613

)

ROBERT SCOTT LIPPERT,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________

)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK
District Judge

MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

DIANE M. WALKER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 5920
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ...................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT
I. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed
To Appoint Substitute Counsel To Represent Mr. Lippert
Because A Complete, Irrevocable Breakdown Of
Communication Between Mr. Lippert And His
Counsel Existed .................................................................................... 5
A.

Introduction

................................................................................... 5

B.

Standard of Review .......................................................................... 5

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed
To Appoint Substitute Counsel ......................................................... 5

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 9
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Glasserv. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) .................................................................. 6

Morgan v. Commissioner of Correction, 866 A.2d 649 (Conn. App. 2005) ...................... 5
Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456, 424 P.2d 390 (1967) ....................................................... 6
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ........................................................................... 6
State v. Guzman, 126 Idaho 368, 883 P.2d 726 (Ct. App. 1994 ) ..................................... 6
State v. Hedger, 115 ldaho 598,768 P.2d 1331 (1989) .................................................. 5
State v. King, 131 Idaho 374,957 P.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1998) ........................................... 6
State v. Lindsay, 124 Idaho 825, 864 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1993) ...................................... 6
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) ...................................................... 6
State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638,637 P.2d 415 (1981) ........................................................ 6
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) .................................................................. 5
United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231 (10 th Cir. 1981) ...................................................... 7
United States v. Massino, 303 F.Supp.2d 258 (2003) ..................................................... 6
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) ........................................................................... 6

Statutes
I.C. § 19-852 .................................................................................................................... 6

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Robert Scott Lippert appeals from the Order Vacating and

Reentering

Memorandum Opinion and Order on Remand to Determine Motion for Substitute
Counsel. Mr. Lippert asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
him substitute counsel because he demonstrated that a complete, irrevocable
breakdown in communication existed and, therefore, the district court deprived him of
conflict free counsel. Therefore, he contends that this Court should reverse the district
court's order denying him a substitute counsel, and remand the matter for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Lippert with sexual abuse of a child under
the age of sixteen years. State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, _, 181 P.3d 512, 515 (Ct.
App. 2007) (hereinafter Lippert I).

Mr. Lippert requested an attorney and the district

court appointed him a public defender.

Id.

During pretrial proceedings, Mr. Lippert

asked the court to replace his trial attorney with a different public defender. Id. On the
morning of trial, Mr. Lippert refused to leave riis jail cell to attend the trial. Id. at_, 181
P.3d at 592.

Eventually, jail staff brought Mr. Lippert to court.

Id.

Upon being

presented to the district court, Mr. Lippert complained about his attorney, however, the
district court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the alleged conflict and into
Mr. Lippert's requests for appointment of substitute counsel. Id. at_, 181 P.3d at 520.
A jury convicted Mr. Lippert and he appealed the Judgment of Conviction. Id. at
P.3d at 512, 514.
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, 181

Among other things in Lippert I, Mr. Lippert challenged the district court's
inadequate inquiry into his complaints about his court-appointed counsel. Id. at_, 181
P.3d at 515. The Idaho Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the district court for
further proceedings "to give Lippert a full and fair opportunity to present facts and
reasons in support of his motion for substitute counsel." Id. at_, 181 P.3d at 523.
The Court of Appeals stated, "If Lippert's complaints about his appointed counsel
amounted to good cause justifying the appointment of substitute counsel, the district
court must also grant Lippert a new trial.

However, if the court determines Lippert's

request for substitution of counsel was unfounded, the judgment of conviction will be
affirmed." Id.
On remand, Mr. Lippert hired an attorney to represent him to assist at the hearing
to explain why he should have received substitute counsel. (R., p.53.) The district court
conducted a hearing on September 15, 2008. (R., p.53.) Mr. Lippert testified that he
had an actual conflict of interest with his trial attorney because of counsel's past
representation of a family member and of a business partner.

(Tr., p.10, Ls.2-6.)

Additionally, Mr. Lippert explained that a breakdown of communication necessitated
substituting counsel. (Tr., p.13, L.6 - p.50, L.4.)
The district court determined that Mr. Lippert did not have good cause for his
request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first day of trial. (R., p.56.) The
court determined there was no actual conflict of interest due to counsel's past
representation of either Mr. Lippert's family member or his business partner. (R., pp.5657.) Thereafter, the district court evaluated whether a complete, irrevocable breakdown
of communication between Mr. Lippert and his appointed counsel existed. (R., p.57.)
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Utilizing a standard mentioned in Lippert I, the district court concluded that it must
consider the following factors:
1) whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; 2) whether
the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the
motion; 3) whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led
to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense; and 4)
whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the
communication breakdown.
(R., pp.57-58.) Upon considering the above factors, the district court concluded that it
was not convinced that a total breakdown of communication occurred. (R., pp.57-62.)
Moreover, it concluded that Mr. Lippert contributed to the communication breakdown.
(R., pp.63-65.)

Although not argued by Mr. Lippert's attorney, the district court also

evaluated whether substitution of counsel should have been granted due to an unjust
verdict, and concluded that good cause did not exists under that theory. (R., pp.66-67.)
Mr. Lippert's attorney failed to timely appeal the district court's decision.

(R.,

p.53.) However, Mr. Lippert timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief to reacquire
his appellate rights.

(R., p.53.) Pursuant to a post-conviction order, the district court

filed an Order Vacating and Reentering Memorandum Opinion and Order on Remand to
Determine Motion for Substitute Counsel. (R., pp.53-69.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to appoint substitute counsel to
represent Mr. Lippert because a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication
between Mr. Lippert and his counsel existed?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Appoint Substitute Counsel
To Represent Mr. Lippert Because A Complete, Irrevocable Breakdown Of
Communication Between Mr. Lippert And His Counsel Existed

A.

Introduction
Mr. Lippert contends the district court erred when it failed to appoint him

substitute counsel. Therefore, the order denying substitute counsel should be reversed
and the matter remanded for a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The district court's decision to overrule a defendant's objection to conflicted

counsel should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Morgan v. Commissioner of

Correction, 866 A.2d 649, 655 (Conn. App. 2005). When reviewing an order for an

abuse of discretion, the appellate courts engage in a multi-tiered inquiry.

State v.

Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). This Court must determine:

(1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the
lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Appoint Substitute
Counsel
"Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by

counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he
may have." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984). The Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
5

accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
U.S. Const. amend. VI.

This constitutional protection encompasses a right to be

represented by conflict free counsel.

Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981 );

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942). Moreover, this protection has long
since been held to apply to state court criminal proceedings through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Powel! v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932);

State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). Due to the pervasive
nature of this right, the district court must proactively protect the accused's Sixth
Amendment rights in order to secure a just and fair trial. United States v. Massino, 303
F.Supp.2d 258, 263 (2003).
Not only does a defendant have a federal constitutional right to the assistance of
conflict-free counsel, Idaho adopted a similar provision in its Constitution. See State v.

Guzman, 126 Idaho 368, 371, 883 P.2d 726, 729 (Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing the
United States and Idaho State constitutional right to be represented by conflict-free
counsel).

Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees the right to counsel.

Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456, 424 P.2d 390 (1967). Our state's appellate cases have
held that a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to assistance of counsel at all
critical stages of the criminal process. State v. King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d 352,
354 (Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P .2d 415 (1981 );

State v. Lindsay, 124 Idaho 825, 864 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1993). In addition, Idaho law
confers a statutory right to counsel in state criminal proceedings. See I.C. § 19-852.
Idaho Code § 19-852 provides that a needy person is entitled to be represented by
court-appointed counsel to the same extent as a person that has a retained attorney.
Id.
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The Lippert I Court acknowledged, "[g]ood cause [for substitution of counsel]
includes an actual conflict of interest;

a complete,

irrevocable breakdown of

communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict."
Lippert I, 145 Idaho at_, 181 P.3d at 522 (citations omitted). Although Lippert I did not

adopt the four-part test identified in United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10th Cir.
1981) for determining whether a breakdown in communication existed, it noted the 10th
Circuit's factors in a parenthetical. Id. at_, 191 P .3d at 523. The following factors:
1) whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; 2) whether
the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the
motion; 3) whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led
to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense; and 4)
whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the
communication breakdown.
See id., were considered by the district court on remand. (R., pp.40-41.)

The district court concluded that Mr. Lippert's motion was timely. (R., p.58 n.4.)
Additionally, the district court conducted an inquiry on September 8, 2008, to
accomplish the second factor - the adequate inquiry. (R., p.58 n.5.) The district court
concluded that Mr. Lippert failed to present sufficient facts to demonstrate a total lack of
communication precluding an adequate defense and that he did not contribute to the
breakdown. (R., pp.58-65.) Mr. Lippert asserts that the district court erred in applying
the facts to the law and, therefore, its conclusion is incorrect.
Mr. Lippert expressed misgivings about his attorney's trial preparation. (Tr., p.14,
L.25 - p.15, L.4.)

He claimed that his attorney failed to discuss whether he should

testify at trial and failed to prepare him for testifying. (Tr., p.27, Ls.2-23.) Additionally,
he claimed that he informed his attorney about witnesses that he believed would be
instrumental in his defense and believed counsel failed to contact those individuals or
complete a full investigation before the scheduled trial.
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(Tr., p.29, L.6 - p.30, L.19.)

Specifically, Mr. Lippert demanded that his ex-wife be contacted and subpoenaed for
trial. (Tr., p.30, Ls.9-19.) Furthermore, Mr. Lippert explained he sought clarification on
certain pretrial issues and reduced those concerns to writing; however, his trial attorney
failed to respond.

(Tr., p.13, Ls.17-24; p.29, Ls.14-18; p.30, Ls.23-25.)

Mr. Lippert

complained that his attorney failed to prepare him for scheduled hearings or inform him
about the hearing ahead of time.

(Tr., p.21, Ls.2-1 0; p.22, Ls.5-10.)

Mr. Lippert

complained that he believed his attorney had alcohol on his breath and that he could not
track in court. (Tr., p.19, Ls.21-25).
Mr. Lippert admitted that he testified at trial and that his attorney asked him
questions and he answered the inquiry. (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-23.) He admitted that after
discharging his attorney at the sentencing hearing, he did pose questions to the
removed attorney, as the court refused to appoint substitute counsel and left the
removed attorney available as standby counsel. (Tr., p.23, L.1 - p.24, L.10.)
Although counsel disagreed with most of Mr. Lippert's accusations, he did
acknowledge that communication after the 404(b) hearing became extremely difficult.

(See generally Tr., p.50, L.17 - p.76, L.3; Tr., p.62, Ls.10-13.) He explained that after
that hearing, Mr. Lippert could only express his dissatisfaction with the witnesses'
testimony, claiming that they were lying. (Tr., p.62, Ls.14-16.) Trial counsel believed
that Mr. Lippert was still able to assist with the defense during the trial. (Tr., p.76, Ls.23.) Mr. Lippert disagreed because he believed most of the communication throughout
the entire representation was a one-way effort by him. (Tr., p.13, Ls.17-24; p.29, Ls.1418; p.30, Ls.23-25.)
In summary,

Mr.

Lippert contends that an

irreconcilable breakdown of

communication occurred which did affect his defense. Moreover, he contends he did
8

not cause the breakdown. Mr. Lippert contends that the facts presented to the district
court demonstrated that he should have been provided substitute counsel. Therefore,
the district court abused its discretion denying his requests.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Lippert respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court order
denying him substitute counsel and remand the matter for a new trial.
DATED this 4 th day of October, 2011.

EM. WALK R
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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